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Appellant Greater Park City Company, a Utah corporation, 
("appellant GPCC"), by and through its counsel Gordon Strachan, 
Esq., and M. Alex Natt, Esq., of the law firm of Strachan & 
Strachan, L.L.C., appeals from the decision of the Utah State Tax 
Commission ("The Commission") denying appellant GPCCs Petition for 
Redetermination of Sales Tax collected erroneously from appellant 
GPCC during the periods June 1991 through June 1994 and May 1992 
through June 1994, prior to the Legislature's July 1, 1994 
amendment of the statute following the Court of Appeals' decision 
in 49th Street Galleria v. Utah State Tax Commission, 860 P.2d 996 
(Utah Ct. App. 1993), cert, denied 878 P.2d 454 (Utah 1994). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Tax Commission's Findings of Fact are published at R9-R11. 
These Findings are entitled to deference if supported by 
substantial evidence. Hales Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Audit Division 
of the State Tax Commission of Utah, 842 P.2d 887 (Utah 1992). 
Appellant GPCC does not challenge the Commission's Findings of 
Fact. This Court should accept the Findings of the Commission as 
true and proceed to a review of the Commission's Conclusion of Law. 
Saunders v. Sharp, 806 P.2d 198 (Utah 1991). 
The Commission's application of the Findings of Fact to the 
law is contained in its "Analysis" section. (R13-R19) . These 
legal conclusions by the Commission are accorded no deference. 
Utah Code Ann. §59-1-610(1) (a) (b) . The appellee incorrectly states 
1 
the standard of review. This Court may not grant "optional 
discretion" to decisions of the Tax Commission. Ld. Appellant 
GPCC challenges the Commission's Conclusion of Law as they are set 
forth in the Commission's Analysis section. (R13-R18). 
The Commission's conclusion that appellant GPCC does not have 
standing to bring this appeal is not supported by the Findings of 
Fact. The Commission's application of the law in the Analysis 
section to the Findings of Fact in R9-R11 is therefore incorrect. 
The Commission correctly found in Finding #7 that appellant 
GPCC does not print the amount of sales tax on its lift and summer 
activity tickets, but includes the sales tax in the price. This 
Finding supports appellant GPCC's right to bring this appeal. 
Finding #8 similarly supports appellant GPCC's position. The 
Commission determined that "[appellant GPCC] has regularly filed 
sales tax returns and paid the amount of tax shown due thereon." 
(RIO). Appellant GPCC is therefore the taxpayer who paid the tax 
to the state of Utah. Finding #8 further states that appellant 
GPCC claimed and retained 1.5% of its sales tax burden as permitted 
by Utah Code Ann. §59-12-108(3) . This fact does not establish that 
appellant GPCC was not the taxpayer. 
Finding #9 supports appellant GPCC's position. Any ski area 
operator could claim its share of the investment incentive to ski 
resorts provided by Utah Code Ann. §59-12-120, regardless of 
2 
whether the ski resort chose to absorb and pay, or collect and 
remit sales tax. 
Finding #10 supports appellant GPCC's ability to claim the 
refund sought in the instant proceeding. Appellant GPCC's 
accounting method can be employed to determine its sales tax burden 
regardless of whether appellant GPCC absorbed and paid, or 
collected and remitted its sales tax. 
The Tax Commission's uncontested Findings of Fact contained at 
R9-R11 do not support the Tax Commission's legal conclusion that 
appellant GPCC lacks standing to bring this appeal. This legal 
conclusion is therefore erroneous and must be reversed. 
Similarly erroneous is the appellee's argument that estoppel 
should bar appellant GPCC's appeal. Estoppel does not apply to the 
case at bar. Appellant GPCC has not represented to the state of 
Utah that it is not the taxpayer. GPCC is the taxpayer in this 
case. There has been no detrimental reliance by the state of Utah, 
and estoppel does not apply in cases of erroneously withheld taxes. 
ARGUMENT 
I. APPELLEE MISSTATES THE STANDARD OF REVIEW. THIS COURT OWES NO 
DEFERENCE TO THE LEGAL CONCLUSIONS OF THE TAX COMMISSION. 
Appellee, the Customer Service Division of the Utah State Tax 
Commission, erroneously asserts that the following is the 
appropriate standard of review. 
3 
In cases involving the application of law to the facts, 
the court may grant some "optional discretion" to the 
agency' s application of the law to the facts based on the 
expertise of the agency in that particular area. Drake 
v. Industrial Commission, 939 P.2d 177 (Utah 1997). . . 
Thus, because the second and third questions presented 
involve an area of special expertise of the Tax 
Commission, the court should apply the deferential 
standard set forth in Drake when reviewing the 
Commission's application of the law to the facts. 
Brief of Appellee at p. 2-3. 
This is not the correct standard of review to be applied in 
this case. Unlike decisions of the Industrial Commission, Drake, 
supra or the Department of Employment Security, Boyd v. Dep't v. 
Employment Sec. , 773 P. 2d 398 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), which are 
governed by Utah's Administrative Procedures Act, the Utah 
Legislature in 1996 established a different, specific standard of 
review to be applied to decisions of the Tax Commission. Utah Code 
Ann. §59-1-610(1)(a)(b) (1996 as amended). The Tax Commission's 
Conclusions of Law are granted no deference, and this Court should 
not grant "optional discretion" as the appellee Customer Service 
Division suggests. B.L. Key, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n., 934 
P.2d 1164 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
In addition, "optional discretion" is granted only to those 
administrative agencies which have demonstrated a particular 
expertise. Drake. The Tax Commission's "expertise", prior to this 
Court's holding in 49th Street Galleria, consisted of taxing 
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companies if their particular activities began with the letter "s". 
According to Roger Tew of the Utah Tax Commission: 
The area of admissions has been an extremely thorny area 
for the tax commission for a number of years. What is or 
what is not a place of amusement, what is or what is not 
an admission has been frankly handled on a very random 
basis for a long time. 
Having said that, what we currently have is a complete 
hodge-podge of items that are taxable and those that are 
not. . .[The items that are taxed have been] 
euphemistically referred to as the S-Test over the years. 
If it started with "S" it was taxed, and if it didn't it 
was not. (R34). 
This Court would err in this case if it were to grant the Tax 
Commission any deference based on an assertive "expertise" for the 
period before the Legislature's July 1, 1994 amendment. 
II. THIS COURT WOULD ERR IP IT SUMMARILY AFFIRMED THE DECISION OF 
THE TAX COMMISSION. 
The appellee asks this Court to affirm summarily the decision 
of the Commission. The appellee erroneously asserts that appellant 
GPCC has not "marshaled" the evidence in order to contest the 
Findings of Fact. Brief of Appellee at p. 7. However, appellant 
GPCC does not challenge the Commission's Findings of Fact. (R9-
Rll). Appellant GPCC instead challenges the application of these 
facts to the law, contained in the Commission's "Analysis" (R13-
19) . Appellee's argument, that appellant GPCC did not marshal the 
evidence misses the point and ignores the Utah Supreme Court's 
controlling authority: 
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[i]f the appellant fails to marshal the evidence, the 
appellate court assumes that the record supports the 
findings of the trial court and proceeds to a review of 
the accuracy of the lower court's Conclusions of Law and 
the application of that law in the case. 
Saunders v. Sharp, 806 P.2d 198 (Utah 1991). 
Appellant GPCC challenges the application of the law to the 
facts in the "Analysis" section of the Tax Commission's decision; 
that is not a question of marshaling the facts. It would be error 
for this Court to affirm summarily the decision of the Commission 
without examining the Commission's application of the law to the 
facts. This Court's review of the Tax Commission's application of 
the law is done without deference. B.L. Key, Inc. v. Utah State 
Tax Comm'n., 934 P.2d 1164 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
III. THE COMMISSION'S CONCLUSION OF LAW, IN ITS "ANALYSIS" SECTION, 
THAT APPELLANT GPCC DOES NOT HAVE STANDING TO BRING THIS 
APPEAL, IS ERROR. 
The Commission, in its "Analysis" section, concludes that: 
[T]he issue of whether the charges of Petitioner [GPCC] 
are for an admission is a moot issue because the refund 
cannot be paid to Petitioner regardless of whether or not 
the charges were for an admission. The Commission 
therefore, finds that Petitioner lacks the standing to 
request the refunds. (R19). 
The Commission, in reaching this conclusion, applied the facts 
found in R9-R11 to the law of standing. The Commission's decision 
is accorded no deference by this Court. B.L. Key, Inc. v. Utah 
State Tax Comm'n., 934 P.2d 1164 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
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The Commission's conclusion that appellant GPCC lacks standing 
is mistaken as a factual and legal matter. The Commission's own 
Findings of Fact (R9-R11) do not support its Conclusion of Law and 
its ultimate decision to deny appellant GPCC standing to bring this 
appeal. (R19) 
According to the Utah Supreme Court: 
[s]tanding is a flexible legal concept designed to 
preserve the integrity of judicial adjudication by 
requiring that legal issues be adequately defined and 
crystallized so that judicial procedures focus on 
specific, well-defined legal and factual issues. To that 
end, the parties must have both a sufficient interest in 
the subject matter of the dispute and a sufficient 
adverseness so that the issues can be properly explored. 
National Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Board of State Lands, 869 
P.2d 909, 913 (Utah 1993). Standing requires suffering of a 
distinct and palpable injury which gives rise to a personal stake 
in the outcome of the dispute. Id. 
Appellant GPCC's distinct and palpable injury is the Tax 
Commission's collection of $3,054,895.36 in sales taxes on lift 
tickets and $185,624.79 in sales taxes on tickets for its summer 
activities. Appellant GPCC is the taxpayer because it paid the 
taxes. Utah law permits a business either to absorb and pay sales 
taxes itself, or to collect the taxes from customers and remit 
those funds to the state. Utah Code Ann. §59-12-107(1). Appellant 
GPCC elected to absorb and pay the sales taxes; it did not collect 
and remit the taxes. (See Appellant's Brief at pp. 15-21). 
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The Commission, in its Analysis/Conclusion of Law section, 
relies on the Findings of Fact in R9-R11 to try to justify its 
conclusion that appellant GPCC does not have standing. An 
examination of these undisputed Findings of Fact demonstrates that 
the Tax Commission's Conclusions of Law in its Analysis should be 
overturned by this Court. 
The Commission's Finding of Fact #7 confirms appellant GPCC s 
standing to bring this appeal. The Commission states: 
7. The tickets which are sold by Petitioner do not 
have printed upon them the amount of sales tax, 
which is included in the price charged for the 
ticket. 
(RIO)(emphasis added). Appellant GPCC does not include the price 
of sales tax on the face of its activity tickets because it has 
chosen to pay sales tax out of its gross sales and not collect and 
remit taxes as the appellee argues. The Commission cannot rely on 
this Finding to support its decision that appellant GPCC is not the 
taxpayer. 
At Finding of Fact #8, the Commission states: 
8. Petitioner has regularly filed sales tax returns 
and paid the amount of tax shown due thereon. On 
those sales tax returns, Petitioner has claimed and 
retained 1.5% of the tax amount as the vendor 
discount as permitted by Utah Code Ann. §59-12-
108(3). That statute permits vendors, who meet 
certain requirements, to "retain an amount not to 
exceed 1.5% of the total monthly sales tax 
collected . . . " 
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Appellant GPCC did claim and retain the 1.5% vendor discount 
as permitted by Utah Code Ann. §59-12-108(3). However, this does 
not require the conclusion that appellant GPCC is not the taxpayer. 
Rather, Finding #8 states that "Petitioner has regularly filed 
sales tax returns and paid the amount of tax shown due thereon." 
(RIO). As is explained in appellant GPCCs initial Brief at pp. 
19-21, this Finding supports appellant GPCC's contention that it is 
indeed the taxpayer in this case: 
The "taxpayer" is the business which actually filed the 
tax return. The Sales & Use Tax Act never uses the term 
"taxpayer" to refer to customers purchasing good and 
services, but only to refer to the entity who actually 
signs the tax return and pays the sales tax to the state-
For the Tax Commission to make the Finding that appellant GPCC paid 
the tax, and then, in the Analysis/Conclusion of Law section to 
conclude that appellant GPCC is not the taxpayer is clear error. 
Finding of Fact #9 states: 
Petitioner has also claimed its share of the investment 
incentive to ski resorts provided by §59-12-120, which 
based the investment incentive upon the proportional 
amount of "sales tax collected from the sale of ski lift 
tickets." 
The Ski Resort Investment Incentive Act assisted Utah's ski 
resorts in their efforts to compete with out of state ski resorts 
who are not required to pay sales tax on ski lift tickets. This 
Act entitled Utah's ski resorts to claim, from the state of Utah's 
General Fund (not from a segregated, sales tax source only fund), 
a cash incentive. The plain language of the Act states: 
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The investment incentive is available to any person 
operating a ski resort in the state of Utah . . . 
Utah Code Ann. §59-12-120(3) (emphasis added). Appellant GPCC 
claimed its share of the investment incentive provided by §59-12-
120. The Act does not, as the appellee Customer Service Division 
argues, restrict this incentive to those ski areas which elect to 
collect and remit sales tax. Ski resorts which absorb and pay may 
claim the incentive. 
To determine how much money each ski resort was to be 
allocated from the state of Utah's General Fund, the Legislature 
determined that: 
The investment incentive paid out of the account shall be 
allocated among ski resorts based on the relation between 
the total sales tax collected from the sale of ski lift 
tickets in Utah to the total sales tax collected from the 
sale of ski lift tickets in Utah by each ski resort. 
Utah Code Ann. §59-12-120(2). The appellee Customer Service 
Division argues that the term ^collect" as used in the Act, would 
preclude those ski resorts who choose to absorb and pay, rather 
than collect and remit, sales taxes from claiming their portion of 
the incentive. However, that over-simplistic reading of the Act, 
suggested by the appellee, conflicts with Utah law. Utah law 
authorizes any business to choose whether it will absorb and pay 
sales tax out of its general revenues, or collect and remit sales 
tax. Utah Code Ann. §58-12-107 (1) (a) ,. see also Robert H. Hinckley, 
Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n. 404 P. 2d 662 (Utah 1965) (Utah Supreme 
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Court rejected the argument that a vendor cannot absorb or pay the 
sales tax himself) . The interpretation urged by the appellee 
Customer Service Division cannot stand. Finding of Fact #10 
states: 
When Petitioner filed its sales tax returns, it 
calculated the net amount of sales by dividing its gross 
receipts by 1.0725, which was to discount the gross 
amount by 6.25% for the sales and use tax, and one 
(1.00%) percent for the resort area tax. Petitioner then 
calculated the tax on the net amount after deduction of 
the 6.25% for sales tax and the one (1.00%) percent for 
resort area tax. 
(Rll). The accounting method chosen by appellant GPCC can be used 
to determine the amount of sales tax apparently due, regardless of 
whether that tax was to be paid out of appellant GPCC's general 
funds received from its customers, or collected individually and 
remitted from appellant GPCC's customers. Appellant GPCC's use of 
the authorized, alternative accounting method does not indicate, as 
the Tax Commission erroneously concludes, that appellant GPCC was 
not the taxpayer who paid the tax. 
The Findings of Fact relied upon by the Tax Commission in its 
Analysis/Conclusion of Law section, to deny appellant GPCC 
standing, do not support that decision. Rather, the Tax 
Commission's Findings of Fact at R9-R11 support appellant GPCC's 
position that as the taxpayer it is the only entity with standing 
to seek a refund of the erroneously-assessed sales tax. The 
11 
Commission's Conclusion of Law that appellant GPCC lacks standing 
to bring this appeal, is erroneous. 
IV THE DOCTRINE OF ESTOPPEL DOES NOT BAR GPCC'S CLAIMS BECAUSE 
REQUIRING THE CUSTOMER SERVICE DIVISION TO REFUND ILLEGALLY 
COLLECTED TAXES WOULD NOT CONSTITUTE LEGAL DETRIMENT. 
The appellee Customer Service Division's argument that the 
doctrine of estoppel bars appellant GPCC's claims for this refund 
also fails. None of three of the essential elements of estoppel 
exist in this case. Those three essential elements are: 
(1) an admission, statement, or act inconsistent with the 
claim afterwards asserted, (2) action by the other party 
on the faith of such admission, statement, or act, and 
(3) injury to such other party resulting from allowing 
the first party to contradict or repudiate such 
admission, statement, or act. 
Celebrity Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Comm'n, 602 P. ,:Id b89, 
694 (Utah 1979). The appellee Customer Service Division has failed 
to establish the existence of any of these elements. 
The appellee Customer Service Division argues that the first 
element of estoppel is satisfied because "Park City filed tax 
returns and claimed that it collected tax from its customers." 
Brief of Appellee at p. 13. Appellant GPCC filed tax returns and 
paid the tax shown due. ..PCC is the taxpayer. Appellant GPCC did 
not include sales tax on the face of its lift and activity tickets 
but chose instead to absorb and pay its sales tax out of its own 
general fund. 
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Appellee argues that appellant GPCC claimed that it had 
collected tax from its customers. Appellant GPCC did collect its 
$263,541 share of the appropriated General Fund amount under Utah 
Code Ann. §59-12-120, but as discussed above, this investment 
incentive was available to any ski area operator regardless of how 
they choose to pay their sales tax. The only representations made 
by appellant GPCC support its claim that it is the taxpayer in this 
case. 
The appellee next claims that the second element of estoppel 
is satisfied because money it received from appellant GPCC has 
allegedly been budgeted and spent in reliance on appellant GPCC's 
supposed representations. This claim suffers from two fatal flaws. 
First, the appellee has failed to produce any evidence that the Tax 
Commission changed its position in reliance on any alleged 
representations by appellant GPCC. The appellee has not shown 
that, but for appellant GPCC's filing of its sales tax returns, the 
Tax Commission would not have budgeted and spent the erroneously 
collected tax. In addition, appellant GPCC was due the ski resort 
investment appropriation regardless of whether it absorbed and 
paid, or collected and remitted its sales tax. Utah Code Ann. §59-
12-120. 
The appellee fails to cite a single case in support of its 
plea to apply estoppel. Neither a case or theory of government 
budgeting would apply the doctrine to facts such as these because 
13 
if estoppel applied on these facts, it would have to apply in every 
tax refui id case. Other states have uniformly held that spending 
wrongfully collected taxes does not constitute a change in position 
for purposes of estoppel. Pennsylvania Co. for Banking & Trusts v. 
Philadelphia, 76 A.2d 443, 445, 167 Pa.Super. 637, 641 (1950) ("The 
city did not shift its position; it merely kept and spent the taxes 
it had unlawfully taken from the Company.") Eveii if the appellee 
Customer Service Division had produced any evidence of reliance, 
that reliance would be unreasonable because Utah Code Ann. 
§59-12-110(2) places the Tax Commission on notice that a refund may 
be requested at: any time within three years of the tax payment. 
Finally, the appellee claims that it would suffer legal injury 
by being forced to refund the money it illegally collected from 
appellant GPCC. However, being required to return illegally 
collected taxes cannot constitute legal detriment because the state 
was i: i o t: e i 11 i 11 e d t o r e c e i v e t h a t in o i i e \ i n t h e first place. 
Pennsylvania Co. for Banking & Trusts, 76 A.2d at 445 ("Estoppel is 
ai I equitab] e defense, and it is not available to avoid the 
obligation arising from Athe unmoral practice una*. 
[governments], in general, kept and used for [government] purposes, 
funds however erroneously paid and in ilawfully received b;; , tl .em. ' " ) . 
Estoppel does not apply in cases such as this. E.g. 
Pennsylvania Co. for Banking & Trust, 7 6 A. 2d at 445; Lonaacre Park 
Heating Co. v. Delaware County, 50 A.2d 706 (Pa. Super. 1948) . If 
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the mere filing of a tax return constitutes a binding 
representation for purposes of estoppel, then every refund would be 
denied. Necessarily, each petitioner will always have made such a 
representation because he will have already paid the taxes at issue 
in the claimed refund. 
Second, if merely budgeting and spending revenues constituted 
reasonable reliance, then that element will always be satisfied 
because every state budgets and spends its revenues. Third, if 
being forced to return illegally collected revenues constitutes 
legal detriment, then that element will always be satisfied because 
a refund necessarily requires a return of funds. 
In short, if estoppel bars appellant GPCC's refund in this 
case, then it bars all refunds in all cases. Such a result is not 
permissible because it conflicts with the Legislature's clear 
directive that any overpayment or wrongfully collected taxes "shall 
be refunded." Utah Code Ann. § 59-12-110(2). 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant GPCC does not contest the Findings of Fact of the 
Commission at R9-R11. Appellant GPCC does challenge the 
application of the law to these facts as contained in the 
Commission's "Analysis'' section. (R13-19) . The Commission's 
decision, that appellant GPCC does not have standing to bring this 
appeal, is not supported by the Findings of Fact. The decision is 
erroneous and should be reversed. 
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DATED th is * l 
1< 
day of September, 1997. 
STRACHAN & STRACHAN 
BY rV.-k. 
M. Alex Natt 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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